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FOR NONTRADITIONAL NAMES’ SAKE:
A CALL TO REFORM THE NAME-CHANGE PROCESS
FOR MARRYING COUPLES
Meegan Brooks*
In a large number of states, women are encouraged to take their husbands’ sur-
names at marriage by being offered an expedited name-change process that is
shorter, less expensive, and less invasive than the statutory process that men must
complete. If a couple instead decides to take an altogether-new name at marriage,
the vast majority of states require that each spouse complete the longer statutory
process. This name-change system emerged from a long history of naming as a way
for men to dominate women.
This Note emphasizes the need for name-change reform, arguing that the current
system perpetuates antiquated patriarchal values and violates the United States
Constitution. By allowing both spouses to change their names on their marriage
certificate without any legal incentive for choosing one name over another—an
approach currently used by Minnesota, Iowa, and Massachusetts—states could
effectively address these problems.
INTRODUCTION
Expecting a woman to take her husband’s name is expecting her
to give up something that she has not only had her whole life, but
something that affiliates her with past generations and present fam-
ily.1 This is a serious sacrifice that should not be expected of the
wife, and yet this has been the system in place in Western cultures
for hundreds of years.
The problem with the current system is not that most women
end up with their husbands’ names. Instead, the problem is the rea-
son behind this practice: the social assumption that women should
change their names, which is the motivation behind the naming
statutes in many states. In those states, women are encouraged to
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, December 2013; B.A., University
of California at Berkeley, 2010. I would like to thank my parents, Kay Brooks and Al Brooks,
for inspiring this piece. In addition, I am deeply grateful to Professor Mae Kuykendall, Calvin
Cohen, Kay Brooks, Cali Cope-Kasten, Nick Pietropalo, and Andrew Tonelli for their
thorough and thoughtful comments. Finally, special thanks to Mike Kimiecik—I can’t wait to
take a new name with you soon.
1. Yofi Tirosh, A Name of One’s Own: Gender and Symbolic Legal Personhood in the European
Court of Human Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 255 (2010) (citing Janet Finch, Naming
Names: Kinship, Individuality and Personal Names, 42 SOC. 709, 714–18 (2008) (analyzing the
extent to which family names are used to show family connections in the United Kingdom)).
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take their husband’s surname at marriage by being offered an expe-
dited name-change process that is shorter, less expensive, and less
invasive than the statutory process that men must complete.2 This
bias reinforces gender stereotypes both within the household and
in society as a whole. The traditional naming system may have been
understandable when it began, at a time when a husband con-
trolled his wife’s legal and property rights.3 In today’s world,
however, it must be reformed to reflect the fact that women have
long been socially and legally equal to men.
The current system should be changed to allow couples to
choose which name they would like to use after marriage, without
any incentive for choosing one name over another. This new system
would allow couples to continue taking the husband’s name, but it
would no longer favor this as a norm. Instead, couples would be
able choose from a variety of “nontraditional naming” approaches
that the current dominant system discourages with a series of extra
costs.4 These alternative approaches would offer spouses the oppor-
tunity to share ownership of a name, so that neither spouse feels
that the wife is sacrificing her origins completely for the sake of her
husband.
This Note emphasizes the need for name-change reform, argu-
ing that the current system—which favors women who follow the
traditional system of taking their husbands’ names at marriage—
perpetuates antiquated patriarchal values and violates the Constitu-
tion. Parts I and II offer a background for naming laws, first by
describing the history of naming in the United States, and then by
outlining the current legal structure for changing one’s name at
marriage. Part III argues that the current system which prefers hus-
bands’ names violates the Constitution and perpetuates outdated
gender norms, and should be reformed. Part IV suggests that states
could effectively address these problems by allowing both men and
women to change their names on their marriage certificates.
I. HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF NAMING
The history of naming in the United States offers important in-
sight into the significance of modern naming practices. This Part is
divided into three sections, each describing a distinct chapter in the
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. This Note defines “nontraditional naming” to include the husband taking his wife’s
surname, hyphenating the husband’s and wife’s surnames, merging the two surnames into a
single name, and choosing a new surname altogether.
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history of naming in the United States. First, it explores the origins
of surnames in England—practices later inherited by the United
States. There, surnames carried a functional purpose and were
changed often and without restriction. Second, it reviews the evolu-
tion of naming as a way for men to dominate women, first under
the doctrine of coverture and later through a series of laws that
punished married women for not using their husbands’ names. Fi-
nally, it summarizes the second-wave feminists’ arguments against
such laws, many of which are still relevant today.
A. Common Law Surnames: Functional and Unrestricted
Because most people in eleventh-century England shared a lim-
ited number of Christian first names, surnames began as a way to
distinguish people after the Norman Conquest.5 Surnames were not
handed down generationally, but were instead used to describe the
specific person using the name.6 Often, people chose names that
conveyed something about themselves, such as where they were
from (John Hill), a parent’s name (John Thomas, John William-
son), a person’s occupation (John Smith), or words that described
that person’s physical or moral characteristics (John Short, John
Good).7 Men and women were able to change their surnames
through common usage,8 and this flexibility made it common for
members of the same family to use different surnames.9 Similarly,
many men and women changed their names several times through-
out their lives as a means of individual expression.10
5. With the Conquest, Saxon names were replaced by a list of about sixteen men’s
names and even fewer women’s names. See Doherty v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 458 (Or. Ct.
App. 2006); Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-Centered
Approach to Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996); ELSDON C. SMITH,
THE STORY OF OUR NAMES 28 (1950).
6. See L. G. PINE, THE STORY OF SURNAMES 15 (1965).
7. See Doherty, 150 P.3d at 458 n.11; PINE, supra note 6, at 12–13.
8. Common law name changes were and in most states still are allowed in the absence
of “fraud, misrepresentation, or interference with the rights of others.” 57 AM. JUR. 2D Name
§ 16 (1988); see also Egner v. Egner, 337 A.2d 46, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Eliza-
beth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761, 770–71 (2007) (citing UNA STANNARD, MRS MAN 112, 115 (1977)).
9. See Smith v. U.S. Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 (N.Y. 1910).
10. See, e.g., PINE, supra note 6, at 15. One commentator described the casual nature of
naming at the time as follows: “By the common law of England a man was entitled to adopt a
new name for himself as one changes a coat.” Emens, supra note 8, at 771 (citing Frederick
Dwight, Proper Names, 20 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1911)).
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B. Coverture: Naming as a Means of Domination
This fairly unrestricted system led to the development of “cover-
ture,” a doctrine that emerged in England during the high Middle
Ages, and which was inherited by the United States, lasting into the
mid-nineteenth century.11 Coverture dictated that the identities of a
husband and wife merged upon marriage, and that the new unit
retained only the husband’s identity.12 After marriage, the wife no
longer had the rights to contract, appear in court, or possess land
independently of her husband.13 At the same time, the husband
gained the right to whatever property his wife brought into the mar-
riage, along with rights to her paid and unpaid labor.14 Names were
an important aspect of this system, because they identified the man
who controlled a given woman’s legal rights.15
The process of naming a person to demonstrate domination over
him or her, however, was by no means a new phenomenon.16 In the
mid-nineteenth century, women, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
first recognized the oppressive nature of coverture after noticing
11. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR HOW
LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 186 (2005); Claudia Zaher, When a Women’s Marital Status Deter-
mined Her Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J.
459, 461–62 (2002).
12. See Mellott v. Sullivan Ford Sales, 236 A.2d 68, 70 (Me. 1967); see also In re Reben, 342
A.2d 688, 691 (Me. 1975).
13. Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.’s Law Common-
place (1763), 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317, 346 (2007).
14. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 983 n.101 (2002).
15. Although this system never mandated that women take their husbands’ names, the
fact that a woman’s legal and social identity was tied to her husband enabled this custom to
develop naturally. Emens, supra note 8, at 771–72.
16. This is, for example, a recurring theme in the Bible. See, e.g., Genesis 2:18 (“It is an
act of authority to impose names, and of subjection to receive them.”); Genesis 17:5 (“No
longer will you be called Abram; your name will be Abraham, for I have made you a father of
many nations.”); Genesis 41:45 (“Then Pharaoh named Joseph Zaphenath-paneah; and he
gave him Asenath, the daughter of Potiphera priest of On, as his wife. And Joseph went forth
over the land of Egypt.”); 2 Kings 23:34 (“Pharaoh Neco made Eliakim the son of Josiah king
in the place of Josiah his father, and changed his name to Jehoiakim. But he took Jehoahaz
away and brought him to Egypt, and he died there.”); 2 Kings 24:17 (“Then the king of Baby-
lon made his uncle Mattaniah, king in his place, and changed his name to Zedekiah.”); Isaiah
62:2 (“And the nations will see your righteousness, and all kings your glory; And you will be
called by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord will designate.”); Daniel 1:7 (“Then the
commander of the officials assigned new names to them; and to Daniel he assigned the name
Belteshazzar, to Hananiah Shadrach, to Mishael Meshach and to Azariah Abed-nego.”); John
1:42 (“He brought him to Jesus. Jesus looked at him, and said, “You are Simon the son of
John; you shall be called Cephas.”).
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the characteristics it shared with chattel slavery.17 American slave-
holders used naming to dehumanize slaves, which they considered
to be their property.18 Like slaves, whose names were changed by
whomever owned them at a given time,19 women changed their
names from that of their fathers to that of their husbands.20 One
feminist from that time stated, in reference to a wife adopting her
husband’s name, that “[l]ike a slave she was brought to life by being
given a name by her master . . . .”21
The custom of women adopting their husbands’ surnames “rip-
ened into law” during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries.22 State courts during this period treated the common-law
naming system as absolute by requiring married women to use their
husbands’ surnames to vote, drive, sue, and obtain passports; this
punished women who refused to take their husbands’ names by re-
stricting their legal rights.23 The courts justified their holdings by
17. See Omi [Morgenstern Leissner], The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 356 n.195 (1998) (citing UNA STANNARD, MRS MAN 161 (1977)).
18. Kelly, supra note 5, at 12–14. Slaves were only given first names, and the most com-
mon names were also common white person names, such as Jack, Tom, and Harry. J.N.
HOOK, FAMILY NAMES: HOW OUR SURNAMES CAME TO AMERICA 289 (1982). Many slave owners
instead chose to name their slaves ostentatious Roman or Greek names such as Caesar, Pom-
pey, Jupiter, or Plato. Id. at 290. Many black men changed their names when they gained
their freedom, sometimes to Liberty or Freeman. Id. at 291–93. Similarly, Nazis used naming
to show domination over others. In one of their first efforts to dehumanize Jewish Germans,
the Nazis renamed Jewish males “Israel” and Jewish females “Sarah.” See Emens, supra note 8,
at 770 & n.16 (citing Robert M. Rennick, The Nazi Name Decrees of the Nineteen Thirties, 18
NAMES 65, 76–77 (1970)).
19. See Emens, supra note 8, at 770.
20. See Omi, supra note 17, at 356.
21. Sheila Jeffreys, The Need to Abolish Marriage, 14 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 327, 328 (2004).
22. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975); see also In re Reben, 342 A.2d
688, 699 (Me. 1975).
23. The foundational language came from Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank, 85 N.Y.
437 (1881), which involved the confiscation of property during wartime. Although the court
set aside the action to confiscate, it stated in dicta, “For several centuries, by the common law
among all English speaking people, a woman, upon her marriage, takes her husband’s sur-
name.” Id. at 449. This analysis was incorrect, because although it was customary for a woman
to take her husband’s name at marriage, this was never required by law. For additional cases
that treat the common law naming system as absolute, see also In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176,
176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (“I feel that, if plaintiff is to receive naturalization, her certificate should
indicate the surname of her husband as belonging also to petitioner.”); Roberts v. Grayson,
173 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1937) (stating that the general custom was for a wife to use her husband’s
surname and first name, together with the prefix “Mrs.,” and that this identification was
“more perfect and complete” than when a married woman used her own first name); People
ex. rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945) (“[W]hen the Legislature ex-
pressly referred to the fact that the name of a registered voter might be changed by marriage
it had in mind the long-established custom, policy and rule of the common law among En-
glish-speaking peoples whereby a woman’s name is changed by marriage and her husband’s
surname becomes as a matter of law her surname.”); Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 152
N.E. 35, 37 (Mass. 1926) (denying recovery for female driver because automobile was regis-
tered in her pre-marriage name); Freeman v. Hawkins, 14 S.W. 364, 365 (Tex. 1890)
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citing the “long-established custom” of a wife taking her husband’s
name upon marriage.24 They also commonly discussed the social
shame that the woman and her family would experience if she kept
her own name, because others would assume that she and her hus-
band were unmarried and that their children were born out of
wedlock.25
The Supreme Court validated the practice of punishing women
for keeping their birth names after marriage in Forbush v. Wallace,26
where it upheld an Alabama regulation requiring that married
women’s drivers’ licenses be issued in their husbands’ names.27 This
legally sanctioned naming system was even more severe than the
one that Stanton and her colleagues had compared to the system
for naming slaves a century earlier. Now, if women wanted to con-
tinue practicing certain aspects of everyday life, they had no choice
but to use their husbands’ names.
(holding that service of process on a married woman in her birth name was inherently inva-
lid). Hawaii is the only state that passed a statute explicitly mandating that women change
their names. See Emens, supra note 8, at 772 n.31 (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1 (1968)
(“Every married woman shall adopt her husband’s name as a family name.”)). For a chart of
state name-change laws in the early 1970s, see Lois B. Gordon, Statutory Development: Pre-Mar-
riage Name Change, Resumption and Reregistration Statutes, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1508 app. at
1521–27 (1974). In addition, some government departments have required women to use
their husbands’ surnames after marriage. See, e.g., Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 523 (6th
Cir. 1977); Comptroller General McCarl to the Secretary of the Interior, 4 Comp. Gen. 165,
165 (1924) (requiring married female federal government employees to use their husbands’
surnames on the payroll).
24. Rago, 63 N.E.2d at 645.
25. See, e.g., In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind. 1974) (denying a woman’s name-
change petition because it would embarrass future children and be an “insult to her hus-
band”); In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (denying a woman the right
to use a surname different from her husband’s because of the social shame arising from the
appearance of cohabitation); In re Lawrence, 319 A.2d 793, 801 (Bergen County Ct. 1974),
rev’d, 337 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (“The situation which would be created by
the granting of plaintiff’s [name change] application, Viz., plaintiff and her husband each
continuing to use the surnames with which they were born, would cause great confusion in
the community in which they live and could well have traumatic effect upon any children
they might have.”); In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (quoting lower
court’s holding) (“[T]o grant the change of name would give ‘the appearance of an illicit co-
habitation against the morals of society,’ that it would not be in the best interest of their
minor children, and that without evidence of some advantage in her professional capacity,
the grant ‘would be detrimental to the institution of the home and family life and contrary to
the common law and customs of this state.’”).
26. 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
27. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222 (M.D. Ala. 1971) aff’d, 405 U.S. 970
(1972). Circuit courts have relied on Forbush as recently as 1996, when the Ninth Circuit, in
an immigration case, insisted on referring to the female petitioner by her husband’s last
name, even when she referred to herself by her birth name. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 967
(9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting). The dissent referred to the majority’s opinion as
“cruelly ironic,” because it found the petitioner’s marriage to be invalid. Id.
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C. Second-Wave Feminists Respond
Largely in response to Forbush, the women’s rights movement
launched another attack on the naming system in the late 1960s
and early 1970s.28 Like Stanton and other early feminists, women’s
rights activists during this period believed that securing the right of
women to control their own names was a crucial step towards gen-
der equality.29 Omi, who has written extensively on modern naming
laws, explained the social significance of naming as follows:
Over time, a woman’s use of her husband’s name came to sym-
bolize acquiescence to a culture that viewed women as
accessories to men, devoid of independent dignity and sta-
tus. . . . Recognition of this sought-after right [to keep one’s
birth name after marriage] would “represent a momentous ad-
vance in the struggle for [a woman’s] separate identity.”30
Given the significance of a woman’s ability to keep her surname
and the hard blow that Forbush dealt to women’s naming rights,31 it
was a major victory when courts and state legislatures began striking
down and repealing laws that pressured women to take their hus-
bands’ names at marriage.
This shift was exemplified by the Tennessee Supreme Court’s de-
cision to strike down a state law requiring married women to
register to vote under their husbands’ names.32 The court recog-
nized that naming restrictions were a barrier for women, and that,
in order for women to progress socially, the law had to be re-
formed.33 The court stated:
We cannot create and continue conditions and then defend
their existence by reliance upon the custom thus created. Had
we applied the rules of custom during the last quarter of a
century, the hopes, aspirations and dreams of millions of
28. See, e.g., Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Married
Women’s Surnames, 5 CONN. L. REV. 598, 602–20 (1973); Julia C. Lamber, A Married Woman’s
Surname: Is Custom Law?, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 783–807.
29. Omi [Morgenstern Leissner], The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 253, 257
(1997).
30. Id. at 258 (quoting Marija Matich Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
233, 247 (1971)).
31. Id. at 258–62.
32. Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975).
33. Id.
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Americans would have been frustrated and their fruition
would have been impossible.34
By the early 1980s, a woman’s right to keep her birth name after
marriage was well recognized,35 and represented a major accom-
plishment for the feminist movement.36 Unfortunately, as the
following section explains, there has been little progress since.
II. CURRENT NAMING SYSTEM
Forty years after the women’s movement challenged naming
laws, the tradition of taking a husband’s surname continues to serve
as an “agent for preserving the present social structure.”37 Although
women now have the right to keep their birth names at marriage,
the system nonetheless favors the traditional approach of women
taking their husbands’ names.
A. Statutory Name-Change Processes
Even though women now have the right to keep their birth
names after marrying, the gender-normative naming practices pre-
viously forced upon couples in the United States and England are
still encouraged in most states.38 The steps that a person must take
to change his or her name varies based on the applicant’s gender,
whether the name change is occurring at marriage or another time,
and whether the applicant is requesting to take his or her spouse’s
surname.
34. Id.
35. See Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1977) (awarding back pay to a
woman after she was suspended from employment at a county health department for refus-
ing to adopt her husband’s surname after marriage); Dunn, 522 S.W.2d at 688 (holding that
a married woman is not required to take her husband’s surname, and that she may vote
without re-registering under her husband’s name); Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections
for Howard County, 295 A.2d 223, 226 (Md. 1972) (“It is only by custom, in English speaking
countries, that a woman, upon marriage, adopts the surname of her husband in place of the
surname of her father.”); Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (hold-
ing that a woman cannot be refused a driver’s license in her birth name); State ex rel. Krupa v.
Green, 177 N.E.2d 616, 619–20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (holding that a married woman was
permitted to be listed on a voting ballot under her birth name).
36. Omi, supra note 29, at 267.
37. Id. at 257.
38. See infra Part II.A.1.
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1. Rules for Women Who Change Their Names at Marriage
In all fifty states, a woman can automatically change her surname
to her husband’s at marriage by simply using his surname on the
marriage certificate.39 The marriage certificate will serve as official
documentation of a woman’s name change, though it is only the
first of many steps. A woman must then use the marriage certificate
to register her new name with the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and with her state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, re-regis-
ter to vote, and apply for a new passport.40 Additionally, she must
also change the name she has on record with private institutions,
including on her credit card accounts, mailing addresses, bank ac-
counts, insurance policies, leases, and titles to property.41 By the
end of this process, most women will have contacted at least thirty-
three different types of entities about their new name.42
2. Rules for Men Who Change Their Names at Marriage
Currently, only nine states explicitly allow men to change their
name at marriage through the process available to women.43 The
SSA, however, has created an interim policy which states that the
Administration will accept a marriage document as a legal name
change for the groom if the new name “can be derived from the
marriage document,” for example, if his new surname is the same
as his wife’s birth name.44 Though less expansive than the SSA’s
39. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, RM
00203.210: CHANGING NUMIDENT DATA (2010), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/
0/151912149da1ef4f8525754c00058990!OpenDocument&Click=; see also Michael Rosensaft,
Note, The Right of Men to Change Their Names Upon Marriage, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 186, 186
(2002) (citing Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW &
INEQ. 91, 96 n.9 (1985)).
40. Emens, supra note 8, at 817–18.
41. Emens, supra note 8, at 818.
42. Id. at 817–18.
43. Those states are: California (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2013)), Georgia
(GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-33.1 (2010)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-1 (2006)), Iowa (IOWA
CODE § 595.5 (2011)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 1D (2010)), Minnesota
(MINN STAT. ANN. § 517.08 (West 2006)), New York (N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 65 (McKinney
2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1999)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-
20.1 (2009 & Supp. 2011)), and Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 106.220 (2011)). Professor Eliza-
beth Emens found that, as a matter of formal law, it is harder for men to take their wives’
name than vice versa in only seven states; in eleven states, however, “it appeared practically
more difficult to change his name than to change hers.”  Emens, supra note 8, at 821–22.
44. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 39, at § B.1.b. The name change
system for passports also changed recently. Until 2008, the United States passport office rein-
forced this outcome by refusing to allow men to change their names with a marriage
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policy for women’s name changes, this provision seems to allow
men in most states to take their wives’ names. Despite the availabil-
ity of the SSA procedure, however, in many states—including some
that formally allow men to take their wives’ names for state pur-
poses under the SSA policy—a man must obtain a court order in
order to take his wife’s name at marriage.45 This means that, before
notifying the thirty-plus entities described above, a man must go
through a series of additional steps to obtain legal documentation
of the name change.
Though the process differs for each state, obtaining a court or-
der generally involves several steps and can take months to
complete.46 First, a person must publish notice of the name change
in a local newspaper continually for a period of several weeks; this
process sometimes requires revealing personal information, such as
previous crimes and bankruptcies.47 The individual must then ap-
pear before a judge and answer questions about the requested
name change.48 This lengthier process replaces what for women
simply involves writing a new name on a marriage certificate.
certificate. This issue was especially relevant for same-sex couples who married in states al-
lowing men to change their names at marriage. In 2008, the United States Department of
State changed its policy to permit a marriage certificate to serve as a basis for a change of
name. Department of State Passports Rule, 22 C.F.R. § 51.25 (2012). This change recognized
that a marriage certificate is equivalent to a court decree in terms of changing one’s name on
a passport. See id.
45. See, e.g., Christina Lopez, Florida Accuses Man of Fraud for Taking Wife’s Name, Then
Backs Off, ABC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/
2013/01/florida-accuses-man-of-fraud-for-taking-wifes-name-then-backs-off/. The case of
Michael Buday and his wife Diana Bijon demonstrates how the SSA procedure does not effec-
tively protect a man’s right to change his name at marriage. See Buday v. California Dep’t of
Health & Servs., No. 2:06-CV-08008 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 15, 2006); see also Name Equality Bill
Wins Assembly Vote, ACLU OF N. CAL., https://www.aclunc.org/legislation/bills_to_watch/
2007/ca_ab_102_marriage_domestic_partnerships_name_equality_act.shtml (last visited
Aug. 15, 2013). Despite the fact that California, because of the SSA provisions, allowed both
men and women to change their names at marriage, S. JUDICIARY COMM., 2007-2008 REG.
SESS., MARRIAGE LICENSES AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP CERTIFICATES: NAME CHANGE. 6–7 (Cal.
2007), available at www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_102_cfa_2007
0627_145741_sen_comm.html, the California records office, a county clerk, and the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles all refused to grant Mr. Buday’s request for a name change based on
his marriage papers. Buday, No. 2:06-CV-08008. As a response to Mr. Buday’s complaint—as
well as a lawsuit from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)—California adopted the
Name Equality Act to clearly establish a man’s right to take his wife’s surname at marriage.
Name Equality Bill Wins Assembly Vote, supra. The American Civil Liberties Union and Equality
California, both sponsors of the Name Equality Act, stated that the bill “simply codifies equal
name change options available to everyone . . . .” S. JUDICIARY COMM., supra.
46. Esther Suarez, Note, A Woman’s Freedom to Choose Her Surname: Is It Really a Matter of
Choice?, 18 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 233, 237 (1997) (citing Sue Ann Wood, For Many Women,
There’s Lots in a Name, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 1994, at 1F).
47. Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 208.
48. E.g., In re Ross, 67 P.2d 94, 95 (Cal. 1937) (en banc).
FALL 2013] Reforming the Name-Change Process for Couples 257
Obtaining a court order also has financial costs that do not apply
when a woman takes her husband’s name at marriage. Court fees
alone can cost hundreds of dollars.49 Applicants must also pay the
cost of publishing a legal notice in a newspaper,50 in addition to the
opportunity cost of having to appear in court and missing work.
People who are nervous about appearing in court without legal
counsel would also be responsible for lawyer fees.
Perhaps the most discriminatory part of this process is that
judges are not required to approve a couple’s new name. In seven-
teen states, there is “virtually unfettered judicial discretion” to grant
name changes,51 and some jurisdictions explicitly require evidence
of “good character,”52 placing the burden on the party seeking the
change. Judicial discretion can make it especially hard for couples
to choose nontraditional names, because judges have the power to
deny name-change requests if they do not agree with a couple’s de-
cision to choose a nontraditional name. In one Florida case, for
example, the judge refused to grant a man’s request to adopt his
wife’s name, stating that marriage was not a good enough reason
49. See Kelly Snyder, All Names Are Not Equal: Choice of Marital Surname and Equal Protec-
tion, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 561, 569 (2009). For example, Lake County, Illinois charges
$271 for a name change. Adult Change of Name, LAKE COUNTY, ILL., http://www.lakecountyil.
gov/CircuitClerk/Publications/County%20Forms/Adult%20Name%20Change%20Informa
tion.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
50. In Montgomery, Ohio, for example, notice of name change costs 45 dollars, and
must be published at least thirty days prior to the hearing. See How to Submit Legal Notifications
for Publication in the Daily Law Journal, COX MEDIA GRP. OHIO, http://www.mcohio.org/gov-
ernment/probate/docs/DailyLawJournalSubmissions_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013);
Name Change, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO, http://www.mcohio.org/government/probate/
name_change.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
51. See Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 193–94. Six of these states give total discretion to the
court, using phrases such as “what a court shall deem right and proper.” See IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 7-804 (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-31-204 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-49-20(C)
(Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.130(1) (2012); Don v. Don, 114 A.2d 203, 205 (Conn.
1955) (finding that a child’s name change was in the best interest of the child, despite objec-
tions from the biological parent); In re Mullinix, 262 S.E.2d 540, 541 (Ga. Ct. App.
1979) (overturning the trial court’s denial of a name change). Eleven other states give signifi-
cant discretion to the courts, applying standards such as “if not against the public interest” or
“for good reasons shown.” Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 194 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-2-101
(Michie 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.21,271 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 41.290 (1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 101-2 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-28-02 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2717.01
(Anderson 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-37-5 (Michie 1999); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 09.55.010 (2012) (“A change of name of a person may not be made unless the court finds
sufficient reasons for the change and also finds it consistent with the public interest.”); MASS
GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 12 (2010) (“The change of name of a person shall be granted unless
such change is inconsistent with public interests.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.410 (2011); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §45.103 (Vernon 1998)). But see In re Rusconi, 167 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Mass.
1960) (stating that while one’s right to change his name is not absolute, it is very broad).
52. Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 208 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 101-4 (1999)).
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for the change.53 Similarly, judges have repeatedly denied unmar-
ried same-sex couples the right to change their names for reasons
of “public policy.”54 Other courts have discussed the “‘fundamen-
tal,’ ‘primary,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘time-honored’ right of a father to the
naming of his family,” implying that the tradition is in some way
rooted in laws of nature.55 The fact that judges have this discretion
and are using it in discriminatory ways makes change all the more
imperative.56
3. Choosing an Altogether-New Name
A handful of states offer couples naming options other than sim-
ply choosing either the name of the husband or wife.57 As of May
2013, only California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
and North Dakota permit merged names through marriage (for ex-
ample, Mary Wilson and Tim Dickson combine to form the
Wicksons).58 Of these, only Iowa, Massachusetts, and Minnesota
permit wholly new surnames through marriage, and only Iowa and
Minnesota allow married couples to change their full names
53. See Lou Gonzales, Man Finds Resistance to Name Change, FLA. TIMES-UNION. Feb. 10,
2000, at D-2.
54. See In re Bicknell, Nos. CA2000-07-140, CA2000-07-141, 2001 WL 121147, at *3–5
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2001), rev’d, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002) (affirming lower court’s
decision that allowing a gay woman to adopt her partner’s surname would go against public
policy); see also In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579, 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (overturn-
ing case that held that denial of same-sex couple’s name-change petition was justified for
reasons of public policy).
55. Deborah J. Anthony, A Spouse by Any Other Name, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187,
208 (2010) (quoting Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); In re Trower, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968), overruled by In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980)).
56. Although each of the cases described above was overturned on appeal, see supra note
54, they demonstrate a judge’s power to decide who may change their names based on the
judge’s personal beliefs. Further, the fact that some couples have been denied nontraditional
name changes in the past may deter other marrying couples from applying for nontraditional
names. Similarly, even though couples whose name changes are denied have the option of
appealing, the additional work involved in an appeal would likely stop many couples from
further pursuing the names they want.
57. My parents chose an entirely new name when they married in California in 1987: Al
Leveille and Kay Upchurch became Al and Kay Brooks. Because such name changes were not
allowed through marriage licenses in California at the time (and still are not allowed today),
they completed the process of obtaining a court order described above.
58. Name Equality Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2013); IOWA CODE § 595.5
(2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 1D (2010); MINN STAT. ANN. § 517.08 (2006); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 65 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03-20.1 to -20.2 (2009 & Supp.
2011).
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through this process.59 Marriage applications in these states have
sections that ask each spouse to write the name that they would like
to use after marriage.60 In both Iowa and Minnesota, this approach
has been used for years,61 showing that such a system is administra-
tively possible. In states that do not explicitly allow altogether-new
names, both spouses are required to obtain a court order if the new
name cannot be derived from the marriage certificate.62
B. Social Norms
Even though women are no longer legally obligated to take their
husbands’ names at marriage, this practice continues to be the
overwhelming norm in the United States.63 This pattern is partly
due to the legal burdens described above, and partly due to estab-
lished social norms—including administrative biases and negative
social stereotypes—which help to perpetuate the current system.
59. IOWA CODE § 595.5 (2011) (“A party may indicate on the application for a marriage
license the adoption of a name change. The names used on the marriage license shall be-
come the legal names of the parties to the marriage. The marriage license shall contain a
statement that when a name change is requested and affixed to the marriage license, the new
name is the legal name of the requesting party.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46, § 1D (2010); MINN
STAT. ANN. § 517.08 (West 2006) (“Application for a marriage license shall be made by both
of the parties upon a form provided for the purpose and shall contain . . . (8) the full names
the parties will have after marriage and the parties’ Social Security numbers.”).
60. See, e.g., Application for License to Marry in Iowa, IOWA DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, BUREAU
OF HEALTH STATISTICS & VITAL RECORDS, http://Co.Black-Hawk.Ia.Us/Recorder/Forms/
Marriage_App.Pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013); Marriage License Application, HENNEPIN COUNTY,
MINN., http://hennepin.us/files/HennepinUS/TSD/Service%20Centers/Birth%20Marri
age%20and%20Death/Files/CC_FORM_MAL_HC2910_MarriageLicenseApp.pdf (last vis-
ited Aug. 16, 2013); Notice of Intention of Marriage, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., DEP’T OF PUB.
HEALTH, REGISTRY OF VITAL RECORDS & STATISTICS, http://www.nahant.org/townhall/forms/
Clerk/Intent_To_Marry.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
61. In Iowa, couples have had this right for more than ten years. 1999 Iowa Legis. Serv.
Ch. 150 (West), available at https://www.legis.iowa.gov/DOCS/GA/78GA/Legislation/HF/
00700/HF00714/Current.html; see also Email from Darlene Maneval, Becker County, Minn.
Recorder, to author (Nov. 26, 2012, 12:58 EST) (on file with author) (“The process has
existed for ages for women but you will notice the language does not limit who it is.”).
62. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 39, at § B.1.d. Alternatively, under
this scheme, one spouse could change his or her name via court order prior to the marriage,
making it possible for the surname to be derived from the marriage certificate; at least in
theory, that person’s spouse could adopt that surname through the marriage certificate.
63. Snyder, supra note 49, at 566 n.23. Although estimates vary as to what percentage of
women choose to change their surnames to their husband’s, it is thought to be about 90
percent. See Emens, supra note 8, at 785.
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1. Relying on Desk Clerks and Sexist Instructions
Since most states do not offer details to the public about who
may change their name at marriage,64 people considering different
name-change options are often forced to rely on advice from the
administrators processing name changes at the county clerk’s of-
fice, along with generalized online instructions. Professor Elizabeth
Emens describes this phenomenon as “desk-clerk law.”65 The idea is
simple: people who have questions are directed to their county
clerk’s office, and whatever the person in the office decides to tell
them determines their understanding of their options. Frequently,
such government workers give “incorrect or normatively driven re-
sponses that discourage unconventional choices. In this informal
way, desk clerks effectively make the rules for many citizens.”66
Desk-clerk law can even replace state law in states that explicitly
allow men and women to choose new names upon marriage. For
example, despite the plain language of the Minnesota statute,67 one
county clerk contacted by the author insisted that a couple would
need a court order in order to choose an entirely new name.68 Even
64. Only twelve states have laws that explicitly address marital name changes. These
states are: Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New York, North Dakota, and Oregon. This list includes all of the nine states that
explicitly allow men to take their wives’ names at marriage. See supra note 43. None of the
remaining three states offer details on who may change their names or how they may do so.
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.010 (2013) (“A change of name of a person may not be made
unless the court finds sufficient reasons for the change and also finds it consistent with the
public interest. A change of name upon marriage, dissolution, or divorce meets these re-
quirements.”); 735 IL. COMP. STAT. § 5/21-105 (2010) (“All name changes shall be made
pursuant to marriage or other legal proceedings.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 100 (1987)
(“Marriage does not change the name of either spouse. However, a married person may use
the surname of either or both spouses as a surname.”).
65. Emens, supra note 8, at 811–27. Emens contacted desk clerks in every state and
asked whether local policy allowed a man to take his wife’s surname at marriage. Id. at 811
n.175. “Clerks in nine states gave information that directly conflicted with a state statute, and
clerks in twenty-six states gave information that conflicted with a stated DMV policy.” Id. at
824 (internal citation omitted). At least one clerk in each of 24 states endorsed a traditional
name choice. Id. at 825.
66. Id. at 765.
67. See supra note 59.
68. Email from Hennepin County, Minn. Serv. Ctr. to author (Nov. 20, 2012, 13:03 EST)
(on file with author) (“In Hennepin County you can not [sic] just change your name that
way. . . . You can check with any of the other counties and see if they allow you to do that but
Hennepin doesn’t.”). Clerks at the other Minnesota county offices I contacted, however, told
me that a couple could choose an entirely new name at marriage without a court order.
Email from Sharon K. Anderson, Cass County, Minn. Auditor-Treasurer, to author (Nov. 26,
2012, 13:32 EST) (on file with author); Email from Susan Anderson, Anoka County, Minn.,
to author (Nov. 27, 2012 at 12:06 EST) (on file with author); Email from Debra Duhamel,
Beltrami County, Minn., to author (Nov. 26, 2012, 14:07 EST) (on file with author); Email
from Betti Kamolz, Brown County, Minn. Recorder, to author (Nov. 26, 2012, 13:25 EST) (on
file with author); Email from Darlene Maneval, Becker County, Minn. Recorder, to author
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if this was the county’s official policy, rather than one clerk’s misun-
derstanding of the law, it is notable that the right to choose a new
name may not be consistently protected even in the states that ex-
plicitly recognize it.
Counties can also encourage traditional naming practices with
the language they use to describe name-change options for mar-
rying couples.69 Several county websites use normative language on
their websites when describing the name-change process for mar-
rying couples.70 For example, the Auditor’s Office website for
Cowlitz County, Washington, says “NOTE TO THE BRIDE: Remem-
ber to sign your current name (not your new husband’s name) on
all the enclosed marriage documents.”71 This language assumes that
the wife will take her husband’s name, rather than keeping her own
or using a nontraditional naming option.
Even when counties recognize a husband’s right to change his
name at marriage, some emphasize that the norm is for the wife to
take her husband’s name. This is often done by prefacing any pro-
cedural information with, “Traditionally, the bride takes the last
name of her husband . . . .”72 Even though such websites give
couples some information about the logistics of changing their
names, the biased language reinforces social norms and perpetu-
ates the notion that women are supposed to take their husbands’
names.
(Nov. 26, 2012, 12:58 EST) (on file with author); Email from Elaine Martig, Big Stone
County, Minn. Recorder & Office of Vital Statistics, to author (Nov. 27, 2012, 12:12 EST) (on
file with author); Email from Marilyn Novak, Benton County, Minn., to author (Nov. 27,
2012, 9:44 EST) (on file with author); Email from Kathy Smith, Taxpayer Servs. Clerk, Carver
County, Minn. Taxpayer Servs. Department, to author (Nov. 26, 2012, 16:21 EST) (on file
with author).
69. See, e.g., Marriage Licensing, COWLITZ COUNTY AUDITOR’S OFFICE, www.co.cowlitz.wa
.us/auditor/marriage_license.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2013).
70. Id.
71. Id. Cf. Obtaining a Certified Copy for Your Name Change, JOHNSON COUNTY REGISTER OF
DEEDS, http://www.johnstonnc.com/mainpage.cfm?category_level_id=661&content_id=2270
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (“If the bride plans to change her name . . .”); Circuit Court
Clerk—Changing the Brides Name After Marriage [sic], CIRCUIT COURT CLERK, CHESTER-
FIELD COUNTY, VA, http://www.chesterfield.gov/content2.aspx?id=8007 (last visited Aug. 16,
2013).
72. Court Services, BUTLER COUNTY PROBATE COURT, http://www.butlercountyprobate
court.org/index.cfm?page=englishMarriage (last visited Aug. 16, 2013); see also Name Change
after Marriage, KING COUNTY, www.kingcounty.gov/courts/marriage/Namechanges.aspx (last
visited Aug. 16, 2013); Marriages, PROBATE COURT OF STARK COUNTY, OHIO, http://www.pro
bate.co.stark.oh.us/marriages.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
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2. Negative Perceptions
One significant reason that women take their husbands’ names
at marriage may be that most women never even realize that there
are alternatives.
On a basic level, it makes sense that when children grow up
knowing that the majority of adult married couples use the hus-
band’s birth name, they may never seriously consider other
options.73 The likelihood that a person chooses a traditional name
is likely reinforced by the child’s parents, who may have followed
the tradition themselves: a woman’s parents may be insulted if their
daughter avoids the traditional name because she thought it was
sexist, and a man’s parents have an interest in their son maintain-
ing the family name.
Furthermore, social forces may deter a person from pursuing a
nontraditional name, even where he or she is aware of the option.
Studies have specifically researched peoples’ opinions about each
others’ naming choices, and there is evidence that many people
have negative reactions to couples who choose nontraditional
names.74 Bill and Hillary Clinton experienced this kind of stereotyp-
ing during Bill’s 1980 gubernatorial race, when Hillary used her
birth name, Hillary Rodham. This sparked criticism from conserva-
tive voters, who saw her name choice as a signal that her husband
did not share their values.75 Bill lost the election to Frank White,
who made a point of calling his wife “Mrs. Frank White” throughout
his campaign.76 Bill went on to win the governorship in the next
election, however, after Hillary replaced her birth name with his.77
Although dropping her birth name probably did not swing the elec-
tion, it is considered to have been a contributing factor.78 When Bill
eventually became president, Hillary reintroduced her birth name,
and began going by Hillary Rodham Clinton, even though 62 per-
cent of the public at the time preferred the name “Hillary Clinton,”
73. See Emens, supra note 8, at 784–85.
74. Kif Augustine-Adams, The Beginning of Wisdom Is to Call Things by Their Right Names, 7
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 19 (1997). See generally Penelope Lockwood et al., Tamper-
ing with Tradition: Rationales Concerning Women’s Married Names and Children’s Surnames, 65 SEX
ROLES 827–39 (2011) (comparing the opinions about name choice of male and female col-
lege students in Canada).
75. Anthony, supra note 55, at 194–95 (citing Jennifer Christman, The Name Game Despite
Options, 90% of Women Choose to Take Husband’s Name, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2000,
at F1).
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compared to six percent who preferred “Hillary Rodham Clin-
ton.”79 During her own campaign for president in 2008, however,
she again went by Hillary Clinton.80
Such electoral impact makes sense, given evidence that married
women who retain their surnames are more likely to be viewed as
career oriented, secular, independent, assertive, well educated, and
feminist than those who adopt their husbands’ names.81 Women
who keep their birth names have also been stereotyped as harbor-
ing less commitment to their marriages,82 even though there is
apparently no evidence that this is actually the case.83 These stereo-
types can sometimes even translate into bullying within a woman’s
social or professional environment.84
At the same time, men are often ridiculed if their wives do not
take their names at marriage. Men in this position have been called
“‘gay,’ ‘wimp,’ ‘the feminine spouse,’ and not ‘real men,’ with ref-
erences to drinking ‘sissy juice’ and ‘turn[ing] in [their] man
card[s].’”85 When the California legislature was reviewing the Name
Equality Act of 2007, which allowed men to take their wives’ names
at marriage, opponents argued that “[g]overnment needs to en-
courage men to be stronger fathers who provide for and protect
their families, . . . not to be sissy men who abdicate their masculine
leadership role because they’re confused.”86
79. Id.
80. Hillary Clinton Drops Maiden Name ‘Rodham’ From 2008 White House Campaign, FOX
NEWS (April 30, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,269263,00.html#ixzz2e8f4oD
8G. Notably, two polls from the prior year indicated that most voters preferred “Hillary
Rodham Clinton” to “Hillary Clinton.” See Poll: Spare the ‘Rodham,’ Spoil Her Election, CNN
(Oct. 20. 2006, 6:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/20/poll.08/; To Be or
Not to Be Hillary Clinton, CNN (May 1, 2006, 10:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLI
TICS/04/27/rodham.poll/.
81. Donna L. Atkinson, Names and Titles: Maiden Name Retention and the Use of Ms., 10
WOMEN & LANGUAGE 37, 37 (1987).
82. Laurie Scheuble & David R. Johnson, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes of
College Students, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 750 (1993); see also Jen Doll, Women Are Still Being
Judged for Not Taking Their Husbands’ Last Names, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (Feb. 24, 2012), http://
www.theatlanticwire.com/entertainment/2012/02/women-are-still-being-judged-not-taking-
their-husbands-last-names/49133/.
83. Doll, supra note 82.
84. See, e.g., Amy Dickinson, Bullies Riled by Maiden Name, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 16,
2012, at D.7.
85. Anthony, supra note 55, at 212; Steve Friess, Post-Wedding Names Get New Look, WZZM
13 (Mar. 21, 2007, 11:12 AM), http://www.wzzm13.com/news/story.aspx?storyid=72829.
86. Yury Kolesnikov, Chapter 567: Saying “I Do” to Name Changes by Husbands and Domestic
Partners, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 429, 441 n.126 (2008) (citing Frank D. Russo, Why Did 26 of 32
California Assembly Republicans Vote Against the Name Equality Act?, CAL. PROGRESS REP. (May 9,
2007), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/why-did-26-32-california-assembly-
republicans-vote-against-name-equality-act).
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These negative stereotypes are a direct extension of the patriar-
chal system that made it the norm for women to take their
husbands’ names at marriage. If, as some people claim, a woman’s
last name no longer carries the patriarchal symbolism that it once
did, these stereotypes would not be so widespread or strong. Their
persistence is clear evidence that the traditional naming system con-
tinues to reflect sexist values, and that this trend will likely continue
unless a more egalitarian naming system is adopted.
III. NEED FOR REFORM
This Part argues that the current naming system used by most
states violates the Equal Protection Clause and likely the Due Pro-
cess Clause. First, this Part describes potential Equal Protection
Clause violations, arguing that justifications for the current laws are
not substantial enough or narrowly tailored enough to justify sepa-
rate name-change processes for men and women. Second, this Part
argues that state laws likewise violate the Due Process Clause, be-
cause people have a fundamental right to choose their own names,
free from government involvement.
A. Equal Protection
As the current system provides for distinct name-change
processes for men and women without any compelling reason, the
system likely violates the Equal Protection Clause. When states allow
only women to change their names at marriage, they discriminate
against both men and women. Men, of course, are discriminated
against because it is more difficult for them to change their names
than it is for women. This system also has a discriminatory effect on
women because it is “symbolic of women’s inferiority and
powerlessness.”87
Only one case has directly addressed the potential equal protec-
tion violation involved in allowing only women to change their
names at marriage. In December 2006, Michael Buday sued the
state of California for unlawful discrimination after being denied
the ability to change his name on his marriage certificate.88 Before
87. Omi, supra note 29, at 264 (citing Joan S. Kohout, The Right of Women to Use their
Maiden Names, 38 ALB. L. REV. 105, 105 (1973); Lamber, supra note 28, at 807; Margaret Eve
Spencer, A Woman’s Right to Her Name, 21 UCLA L. REV. 665, 686 (1973)).
88. Buday v. California Dep’t of Health & Servs., No. 2:06-CV-08008 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec.
15, 2006).
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the case could be decided on its merits, however, California altered
the law to permit such changes, mooting the question.89 Although
no court has directly ruled on the constitutionality of naming laws
under the Equal Protection Clause, the laws’ differential treatment
of individuals based on gender makes them good candidates for
claims of discrimination.90
The Supreme Court has established that gender discrimination
claims are to be analyzed through the lens of intermediate scru-
tiny.91 To satisfy this standard, “classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives.”92 The most commonly
advanced “objectives” for statutes that create different naming laws
for men and women are 1) custom and tradition, 2) preservation of
the family unit, 3) administrative convenience, and 4) prevention
of fraud.93 As the following sections demonstrate, none of these in-
terests rise to the level of an important governmental objective that
would constitutionally justify such discriminatory laws.
1. Custom and Tradition
First, some states rationalize the current dominant statutory
framework because it is consistent with centuries of tradition.94 As
89. Press Release, ACLU of S. Cal., ACLU/SC and Partners Win Settlement in Equal
Rights Fight for a Husband to Adopt His Wife’s Surname (May 5, 2008), available at http://
www.aclu-sc.org/aclusc-and-partners-win-settlement-in-equal-rights-fight-for-a-husband-to-
adopt-his-wifes-surname/.
90. In a series of related cases, courts have repeatedly struck down laws automatically
assigning newborns the surnames of their fathers, finding that this default violates the Equal
Protection Clause by favoring male parents over their female spouses. See O’Brien v. Tilson,
523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (“The [c]ourt need not decide whether the state must
show a compelling state interest or some lesser interest . . . because even under the most
relaxed of standards . . . the statute proves to be patently defective.”); Jech v. Burch, 466 F.
Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979) (“[P]arents have a common law right to give their child any
name they wish, and . . . the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from arbitrary state
action.”); see also Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (denying father’s petition,
which was based on the “time honored right” of fathers to have their children bear their
names, to change his child’s surname from a hyphenation of both parents’ surnames to
solely his own).
91. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 197 (majority opinion).
93. Omi, supra note 29, at 262. Omi also cited a fifth argument, that the harm created by
naming inequalities is de minimis. As she explains, this claim can be easily dismissed, because,
among other reasons, “the matter of the name is not a de minimis injury and that this dismis-
sive attitude ignored the function of names and vastly underestimated their impact.” Id. at
264.
94. See Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 963; Doherty v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 459 (Ore. Ct. App.
2006) (citing Richard H. Thornton, The Controversy Over Children’s Surnames: Familial Auton-
omy, Equal Protection and the Child’s Best Interests, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 303); In re Marriage of
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Omi has explained, however, “[t]o subject different groups to dis-
parate treatment because society historically has done so
undermines the very purpose of equal protection.”95 In many of the
Supreme Court’s most prominent equal protection cases—regard-
ing segregation,96 anti-miscegenation,97 gender discrimination,98
and, most recently, the Defense of Marriage Act99—the Court has
struck down disparate treatment practices, even though they were
rooted in longstanding traditions.
The notion that men are stronger than women and that they
control women is deeply ingrained in the history of this tradition of
discrimintatory naming and should be abandoned. The current
naming system originated under coverture, which stripped a
woman of her legal identity when she married. This system is a
“relic, left over from this nation’s long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination,”100 something that “belongs in the same trash
can as dowries.”101 Though rooted in tradition, that tradition is not
a proud one, and certainly not one worth protecting.
2. Preservation of the Family
The “preservation of the family” justification originated at a time
when courts feared that children with different names than their
mothers would be presumed illegitimate and scorned by society.102
This argument carries little weight in contemporary society, where
it is not uncommon for a child to have a different last name than
Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 645, 620 P.2d 579, 582 (1980) (“It is argued that rules preferring
the paternal surname are justified because they formalize long-standing custom . . . .”); see
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566–70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ( “[The
majority’s opinion counts] for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of
men’s military colleges supported by both States and the Federal Government.”); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388–89 (1979) (“We reject, therefore, the claim that the broad,
gender-based distinction of [the statute] is required by any universal difference between ma-
ternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s development.”). See generally Michael
Mahoney Frandina, A Man’s Right to Choose His Surname in Marriage: A Proposal, 16 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 155, 167 (2009).
95. Omi, supra note 29, at 263.
96. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
97. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11 (1967).
98. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1976).
99. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013)
100. Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 210 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101. Greg Risling, Man Files Lawsuit to Take Wife’s Name, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2007, 5:52
PM) (quoting Mark Rosenbaum, director of ACLU in Southern California), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011201370_pf.html.
102. Omi, supra note 29, at 265.
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his or her mother.103 Divorced, same-sex, and inter-cultural married
couples are also becoming more common, none of which fit within
the antiquated naming system described above.104 Additionally, if
couples were allowed to take any surname at marriage, they would
be able to choose an altogether-new name, allowing both parents to
share a name with their child, while also having mutual ownership
of the family name.
3. Administrative Convenience
Desiring administrative convenience would also not satisfy inter-
mediate scrutiny. In Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court made this
clear when it stated, “To give a mandatory preference to members
of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the
elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause . . . .”105 In Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court recognized that
decisions following Reed have likewise “rejected administrative ease
and convenience as sufficiently important objectives to justify gen-
der based classifications.”106
The administrative convenience argument has been advanced
and subsequently rejected in two name-change cases that are analo-
gous to the name-change laws in question here.107 In O’Brien v.
Tilson, for example, the Eastern District of North Carolina stated
that “[i]n this age of electronic data processing, the Court cannot
conclude that permitting plaintiffs to do as they wish would render
it impossible or even minimally more costly or difficult for the
State . . . to keep track of its new citizens.”108 Similarly, in Jech v.
Burch, a Hawaii court rejected the state’s argument that allowing
nontraditional names would require altering the state’s entire re-
cord-keeping system, and that it would thereby cause too much
103. Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 201.
104. Although there are no available studies on the marital naming choices of same-sex
couples, Emens offers some data on couples who formed civil unions in the first year that the
status was in effect in Vermont. Emens, supra note 8, at 789 (citing research from Esther
Rothblum and Glen Elder). Of the 2,305 couples whose names are both known, 6 percent
share some or all of their last names. Female same-sex couples were more likely to share last
names than male same-sex couples (approximately 7 percent of female couples versus 4 per-
cent of male couples).
105. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
106. 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689–90,
(1973).
107. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp.
714, 716 (D. Haw. 1979).
108. O’Brien, 523 F. Supp. at 497.
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administrative inconvenience.109 Although these holdings deal with
the right to name children, they demonstrate that administrative
burden is not substantial enough to justify discriminatory naming
practices.
4. Fraud
Unlike the three previous justifications, the prevention of fraud
and identity theft may be a compelling state interest,110 especially
because creditors rely on the ability to correctly identify individuals
to collect debts.111 However, despite the clear importance of this
state interest, current state laws cannot survive intermediate scru-
tiny, because the laws are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to the
interest of fraud prevention.
The prevention of fraud, for instance, cannot justify some states’
rule that women may take their husbands’ surnames at marriage,
but men may not take their wives’ surnames. Women in all fifty
states already have the ability to change their names to their hus-
bands’ at marriage.112 If states allow and even encourage this
behavior for women, it is not justifiable for them to argue that men
should not have the same right to adopt a spouse’s name at mar-
riage because it may lead to more fraudulent behavior.
Although the fraud argument has more traction when focused
on couples that choose entirely new names at marriage, existing
statutes are much more extreme than necessary to achieve the
state’s goal. Currently, most states require an entirely separate and
more difficult process for couples that want a completely new name
at marriage. States could limit the requirement of obtaining a court
order to people who are more likely to commit fraud, such as those
who have declared bankruptcy or who have specific criminal
backgrounds.
109. Jech, 466 F. Supp. at 718. In Jech, the court found that these justifications did not
even satisfy rational basis review.
110. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that a child’s surname
could fraudulently indicate paternity where none exists). The prevention of crime in general
is also a legitimate government interest. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199–200 (“Clearly, the protec-
tion of public health and safety represents an important function of state and local
governments.”).
111. See Omi, supra note 29, at 263–64.
112. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 39; see also Rosensaft, supra note 39, at
186 (citing MacDougall, supra note 39, at 96 n.9).
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This sort of filter is already used by many states.113 In Tennessee,
for example, the government does not allow people who have com-
mitted certain crimes to change their names as a general rule.114 It
is notable, however, that in Tennessee people who have committed
the specified crimes are allowed to change their names at marriage,
even though they do not have this right at any other time.115
Finally, it should not be forgotten that states may also deter
fraudulent name changes by punishing them as serious crimes. All
fifty states have rules stating that a person cannot change his or her
name for fraudulent purposes—at marriage or any other time.116 A
state may deter fraudulent name changes by increasing possible
punishments, or including information about the crime and possi-
ble sentences on the marriage license application.
Given these alternative options, restricting marriage name
changes to women is simply not narrowly tailored enough comport
with equal protection.
5. Conclusion of Equal Protection Analysis
None of the above rationales sufficiently justify distinct name-
change procedures for men and women. Custom and preservation
of the family unit are unlikely to pass even rational basis review.
Courts have also found that administrative convenience is not a
strong enough state interest to satisfy the rational basis test; it would
therefore clearly fail to pass muster under an elevated level of scru-
tiny. Although the state may have a compelling interest in
preventing fraud, name-change regulations are not related to this
goal closely enough to be constitutionally sound. State govern-
ments’ unequal treatment of men and women therefore fails to
promote any state interest sufficient to satisfy equal protection. This
system cannot survive scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
113. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-15-101 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5901(c)
(Supp. 2012); FLA. STAT. § 68.07(2)(c)–(d) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN § 7-805 (2010) (sex
offenders); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2010) (felons and people convicted of sexual
crimes); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-2 (West 2011) (felony convictions in last 10 years); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13:4751 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 711.1(3) (West 2012) (criminal
record).
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-8-101(b) (Supp. 2012).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 693 (Me. 1975) (interpreting the Maine general
name-change statute as requiring a lack of fraud); In re Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ind.
1974) (stating that the only job of the Indiana courts with regard to name change is to make
sure there is no attempt to fraudulently rename).
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B. Due Process Clause
Current laws also violate the Due Process Clause by infringing on
the right to choose one’s own name, which meets the criteria for a
fundamental right outlined by the Supreme Court. If courts recog-
nize a person’s fundamental right to choose his or her own name,
they would apply an even stricter form of scrutiny than the interme-
diate level of scrutiny examined above.117
Additionally, restricting an individual’s right to choose his or her
own name violates the right to privacy—also a fundamental right—
because naming is a highly personal choice that people have a right
to make free from government interference. The choice of name is
similar to other family-related privacy rights, and should likewise be
recognized by the courts.
Because states’ justifications for their current naming restrictions
would not satisfy these high standards, current naming statutes are
unconstitutional.
1. Fundamental Right to Choose One’s Own Name
In Washington v. Glucksberg118 and Lawrence v. Texas,119 the Su-
preme Court laid out two seemingly divergent tests to determine
whether or not a right is fundamental. The Lawrence court applied a
broad understanding of the Due Process Clause, stating that “mat-
ters[ ] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”120 The Glucksberg court applied a stricter standard,
stating that the Due Process Clause specifically protects rights that
are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”121 and “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”122 Together, according to
the Glucksberg court, these prongs work to determine “whether a
purported right is historically ‘fundamental.’”123 Although these ap-
proaches are starkly different, both tests lead to the conclusion that
choosing a name is a fundamental right.
117. See supra Part III.A.
118. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
119. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
120. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
121. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703.
122. Id. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
123. Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Law-
rence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV. 409, 420 (2006).
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The deeply personal choice of how to be recognized by others
clearly satisfies the Lawrence test. As the California Name Equality
Act states, one’s name choice is a “profoundly personal reflection of
one’s individuality, equality, family, community, and beliefs.”124 A
name represents a person’s sense of self, while also acting as an
identifier for that person’s role in society. As attorney and feminist
Margaret Eve Spencer has noted:
A name is a means of identification; it is a shorthand designa-
tion of everything that serves to make an individual
identifiable and unique: appearance, background, personality,
intelligence, and ideals. An individual realizes early in life this
essential connection between a particular sound and the indi-
vidual’s self-image.125
Given the central role that a person’s name has in his or her life,
interaction with others, and own sense of self, name choice fits
squarely within Lawrence’s definition of a fundamental right.
Even under Glucksberg’s more narrow approach, name choice
would still be protected as a fundamental right. As described in Part
I, men and women had a recognized right to change their names at
will under English common law since the beginning of the eleventh
century,126 as long as they were not doing so for fraudulent pur-
poses.127 This system was inherited by the United States, creating
the foundation for the naming laws that exist today. The common
law right to change one’s name still exists in most states, and
formed the foundation for today’s statutory process. Although mod-
ern statutory laws restrict the right to choose one’s own name, such
124. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1279.6 (West 2013). Although the Act ultimately limited the
naming options for couples at marriage, its language reflects a deep concern for protecting a
person’s right to choose his or her own name.
125. Spencer, supra note 87, at 686. Spencer made this argument in the 1970s, in opposi-
tion to the legal structure that forced women to take their husbands’ names at marriage.
Although the purpose of her argument has since been fulfilled, the argument itself continues
to be pertinent: because a person’s name plays such a central role in his or her overall devel-
opment, people should enjoy the right to choose the name that they use rather than having
the government choose the name for them.
126. See supra Part I.A.
127. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1999) (“The opportunity to make [the
choice of surname upon marriage] is supported by ancient common law principles.”); see also
MacDougall, supra note 39, at 103 (“[T]he common law recognizes the right of all persons to
use and be known for legal and social purposes by the surname(s) they choose as long as they
do not do so for a fraudulent purpose.”).
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laws are quite recent when compared to the common law
tradition.128
Because the right to choose one’s own name is a fundamental
right under either test, naming statutes should be subject to strict
scrutiny under a due process analysis.129 The Supreme Court has
defined this level of scrutiny by stating that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the in-
fringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”130 As the prior section explains, the only possibly compel-
ling governmental interest in restricting the name-change process is
combating fraud. Even if the court accepted fraud prevention as a
compelling interest, however, most state statutes are much broader
than necessary to achieve that purpose. Therefore, the statutes are
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.
2. Privacy
The right to choose one’s own name is also protected by a per-
son’s fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to marry, the right to
use contraception, and other such privacy rights could be grouped
together and described as “freedom of choice in the basic decisions
of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contracep-
tion, and the education and upbringing of children.”131 The right
to choose one’s own name falls into this category, as it is a highly
personal decision that should be made free from government
interference.
128. Based on the statutory annotations, most statutory naming laws appear to have been
enacted in the mid-to-late nineteenth century or early twentieth century. Julia Shear
Kushner, The Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. REV. 313, 328 (2009) (citing ARIZ. REV.
STAT. §§ 442–443 (1901)); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1275 (1872); COLO. GEN. LAWS
§ 1851 (1877); 1860 HAW. SESS. LAWS 32; 1877 LA. ACTS 106; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 256, § 1
(1851); N.Y. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2262 (1895); 1919 PA. LAWS 822.
129. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citations omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (“Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held
that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state inter-
ests at stake.”).
130. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993).
131. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (holding that a Georgia statute which re-
stricted abortions was unconstitutional); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education.”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–88 (1978) (finding a fundamental pri-
vacy right to marry).
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At least one court has validated the privacy argument in the con-
text of naming. In O’Brien v. Tilson, the Eastern District of North
Carolina explicitly recognized a person’s right to privacy as it re-
lates to naming choices when it invalidated a state law that favored
men over women in the process of naming children.132 Quoting Jech
v. Burch, the court said that the statute in question clearly invaded
the rights to privacy and personal expression:
The common experience of mankind, whether parents, ago-
nizing over a name for their newborn child, or grandparents
trying to participate in the naming process, or grown children
living with the names their parents gave them, points up the
universal importance to each individual of his own very per-
sonal label.133
The reasoning of the court in O’Brien is similar to Judge Arnold’s
dissent in Henne v. Wright, which specifically addresses the right of
people to choose their own names: “I take it the [c]ourt would not
deny a citizen the right to choose her own name, absent some com-
pelling governmental interest. . . . There is something sacred about
a name. It is our own business, not the government’s.”134 Likewise,
proponents of California’s Name Equality Act argued that the “peo-
ple, not the government, should decide basic issues like whose
name to take.”135
Because the right to privacy in name choice is likely a fundamen-
tal right under the Due Process Clause, the same strict scrutiny
analysis offered in the previous subsection should apply under this
theory as well.136 As discussed above, current state naming statutes
are not narrowly tailored to fit a compelling state interest and,
therefore, are unconstitutional.
C. Need to Respond to a Changing Society
In addition to constitutional concerns, the need for reform is
bolstered by the fact that nontraditional approaches to naming may
gain traction in the near future. One study found that 70 percent of
132. O’Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
133. Id. (quoting Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979)).
134. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
135. Kolesnikov, supra note 86, at 442 (citations omitted).
136. See supra Part III.B.1.
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male college students and almost 85 percent of female college stu-
dents believe a man “should” take his wife’s last name in some
circumstances.137 This indicates that a substantial percentage of
men may be open to choosing a nontraditional name. Further,
studies have consistently shown that more educated women,138 ra-
cial minorities,139 and women who marry at later ages140 are more
likely to choose some form of nontraditional name than women
who do not fall into these categories. Because the population is be-
coming increasingly educated,141 is marrying later in life,142 and is
becoming more diverse,143 it is likely that nontraditional names will
become more widely accepted and will increase in popularity. This
prediction is supported by a 2000 study, which found that brides
married between 1990 and 1996 were about 12 times more likely to
choose a nonconventional name than brides married between 1966
and 1971.144
A series of other trends may also indicate a strong future for non-
traditional naming. A 2011 study found that women who had non-
religious civil ceremonies were more likely to keep their names
than women with religious ceremonies, with 55.9 percent doing
so.145 Given that the number of nonreligious Americans is on the
rise,146 it is likely that nontraditional names will become more popu-
lar in the coming years. The rapidly increasing support of same-sex
137. David R. Johnson & Laurie Scheuble, Marital Name Change: Plans and Attitudes of
College Students, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 747, 750 (1993).
138. Claudia Goldin & Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames at Marriage and
Beyond, 18 J ECON. PERSP. 143, 144–45 (2004).
139. See generally Jean M. Twenge, “Mrs. His Name”: Women’s Preferences for Married Names,
21 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 417, 417–29 (1997).
140. Goldin & Shim, supra note 138. See generally Ernest L. Abel & Michael L. Kruger,
Taking Thy Husband’s Name: The Role of Religious Affiliation, 59 NAMES 12 (2011); David R.
Johnson & Laure K. Scheuble, Women’s Marital Naming in Two Generations: A National Study, 57
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 724 (1995).
141. Hope Yen, Census: Women Top Men in Advanced Degrees, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2011,
3:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42767867/ns/us_news-life/t/census-women-top-
men-advanced-degrees/#.ULLMbIc0WSo.
142. Enjoli Francis, Marriage Rate Falls to Record Low in U.S., Pew Says, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14,
2011, 2:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/marriage-rate-falls-to-re-
cord-low-in-u-s-pew-says/.
143. See Susan Saulny, Census Data Presents Rise in Multiracial Population of Youths, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25race
.html.
144. See generally Laurie K. Scheuble et al., Trends in Women’s Marital Name Choices: 1966-
1996, 48 NAMES 105 (2000).
145. See generally Abel & Kruger, supra note 140.
146. Jeff Stone, Number of Nonreligious Americans Continues to Increase: One-Fifth Are Agnostic,
Atheist, or Believe in Nothing, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 21, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://www.ibtimes.
com/number-nonreligious-americans-continues-increase-one-fifth-are-agnostic-atheist-or-be
lieve-nothing.
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marriage147 may also lead to more acceptance and use of nontradi-
tional naming. As the public begins to recognize that people should
have the right to marry whom they want, they may also begin to
recognize that people should be able to choose their own names,
whether or not this has been the traditional practice. Finally, for-
eign-born women and women of color favor nontraditional
surnames more than native-born and white women, respectively.148
As the population becomes more multiracial149 and the foreign-
born population in the U.S. increases,150 the acceptance of non-
traditional names may likewise increase.
Despite these signs of potential progress, only 10 percent of
women currently choose not to take their husbands’ names at mar-
riage.151 If alternative options become as accessible as traditional
ones, however, nontraditional options may gain popularity. For ex-
ample, the trend of merging names is becoming a well-recognized
option in England152 and is a viable alternative for couples seeking a
more egalitarian family name in the United States. The presence of
alternative names in the U.S. has gained increased attention in the
past several years.153 Although there is no evidence that the number
147. CNN Poll: Americans’ Attitudes Toward Gay Community Changing, CNN POLITICAL
TICKER (June 6, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/06/cnn-poll-
americans-attitudes-toward-gay-community-changing/.
148. Twenge, supra note 139.
149. See Saulny, supra note 143.
150. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO, ET AL., AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, ACS-19, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 10 (2012),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-19.pdf.
151. See supra note 63.
152. In England, this practice is known as “meshing.” See, e.g., Stephen Adams, Couples
Meshing Surnames, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 6, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/6743306/Couples-meshing-surnames.html; Sarfraz Manzoor, The Clanzoors? Never!,
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2011), http:// http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/may/
28/sarfraz-manzoor-wife-surname.
153. Because there are no national or state statistics on the number of women choosing
nontraditional names, see supra note 63, anecdotal evidence provides the best support for this
trend. See, e.g., Maya Blackmun, By Whatever Name, Bride Still Herself, OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 2002,
Southwest Zoner Lake Oswego, at 6; Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., A Tale of Two Rachels, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2006, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/08/opinion/
08dowd.html; Gonzales, supra note 53; Jane Greig, Prince or Pauper, Fish or Fowl, Creek or Can-
yon Have at Least One. Some Are Dropped; Others, Taken in Vain Shakespeare is Not the Only One to
Have Wondered What’s in a Name, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Mar. 25, 2000, at D1 (giving
advice to newlyweds who choose alternative surname schema); Husband Takes Wife’s Name,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, at 2B; Jessica McBride, More Grooms Are Saying ‘I Do’ to
Taking Bride’s Last Name in the Name of Love, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1999, Lifestyle,
at 1; Steve Friess, More Men Taking Wives’ Last Names, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2007, 12:16 PM)
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-20-names-marriage_N.htm; Joanna God-
dard, This Couple Got Married and Made Up a New Last Name! Here It Is . . . , GLAMOUR (Aug. 27,
2009, 12:30 PM), http://www.glamour.com/weddings/blogs/save-the-date/2009/08/this-
couple-got-married-and-ma.html; Jodi Rudoren, Meet Our New Name, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
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of nontraditional names would further increase if couples were
given the compromise that this Note proposes, making more op-
tions available and adding legitimacy to those options would at least
likely lead couples to consider the aspects of a name about which
they care most.
IV. SUGGESTED REFORM
Couples should have the freedom to choose the surname they
want at marriage without being penalized with longer and more
expensive procedures. This Note recommends a national naming
system similar to those already used in Iowa, Minnesota, and Massa-
chusetts.154 These systems allow people to change their surnames
when they get married without undergoing the expensive, time-
consuming, and invasive process of obtaining a court order. By al-
lowing couples to change their names at marriage, states would give
legitimacy to nontraditional naming practices, a first step toward
negating the stigmatization of such options. Allowing couples to
choose any name would be a better response to these problems
than simply extending women’s naming rights to men. This Part
outlines a suggested reform, including a series of supplemental
changes that would help make the reform more effective.
A. Extending Women’s Rights to Men is Not Enough
Several academics have argued that extending to men the rights
currently held by women would be an adequate solution to the
problems outlined in Part III. However, several constitutional and
social factors favor allowing couples to choose an altogether-new
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/fashion/sundaystyles/05NAME.html; The Last
Name Project, FROM TWO TO ONE, http://www.fromtwotoone.com/p/the-last-name-pro-
ject.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); Rachel Buell, Changing Your Name After Marriage: Yours,
Mine, and Ours: Perspectives on the Name Change Debate, HUFFPOST WEDDINGS (June 19, 2012
11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/18/changing-your-name-after-mar-
riage_n_1607488.html; see also Diana Altman, A Married Name Without the Hyphen, FORBES
(Oct. 19, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/19/maiden-married-hyphen-
ated-names-forbes-woman-time-license.html; Judy Berman, Take Your Husband’s Name . . . or
Face Jail Time?, SALON (Aug. 12, 2009, 1:13 PM EDT), http://www.salon.com/2009/08/12/
name_change/; Katherine Rosman, Katie Rosman Was My Name. And Still Is, WALL ST. J. (July
17, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023042033045764504040317655
20.html; Anat Shenker-Osorio, I Do, Unfortunately, He Doesn’t: Name Changing and Egalitarian
Marriage, HUFFPOST BUSINESS (Mar. 25, 2010, 3:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
anat-shenkerosorio/i-do-unfortunately-he-doe_b_513436.html.
154. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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name rather than limiting their name choices to those already held
by either spouse.
1. Constitutional Arguments
Although state governments would resolve the equal protection
issues described above if they extended women’s naming rights to
men, due process issues would still exist. If men were universally
permitted to take their spouses’ names at marriage, then couples
would have three options—keeping separate names, taking the
woman’s, or taking the man’s—rather than the two options nor-
mally available. The naming choices would still be almost as
restricted as they are now, with the only difference being that men
could also change their surnames to one of these highly restricted
options. In such a system, the government would still be punishing
couples interested in nontraditional names by making them un-
dergo a more extensive name-change process. The slightly
expanded options for name choice would not tailor the restriction
narrowly enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.
2. Social Arguments
Given the longstanding history and widespread use of the cur-
rent naming tradition, merely offering men the option of taking
their wives’ names—as has been advocated by Professor Deborah
Anthony,155 Michael Frandina,156 and Michael Rosensaft157—would
likely do little to change naming behavior in practice. The current
system represents patriarchal values that have been present in the
United States since the country’s beginning, and most men would
be hesitant to completely forfeit their own names for those of their
wives.158 The choice of something as important as a name should
not be based on assumptions, social pressures, or procedural short-
cuts, but instead on men and women’s own feelings about how they
want to identify themselves.
When a man changes his surname at marriage, he is arguably
sacrificing more than if he were a woman, because he would be
155. See Anthony, supra note 55, at 214–15.
156. See Frandina, supra note 94, at 167–68.
157. See Rosensaft, supra note 39, at 195–97.
158. One study found that only 12 percent of male college students think that a man
should take his wife’s name at marriage if she wants him to. Johnson & Scheuble, supra note
140, at 150.
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doing so against the grain of social norms. Deborah Anthony ar-
gues that this longstanding custom of women taking their
husband’s names is the reason that women continue to do so, even
though they are not legally required to:
[I]t would be virtually unthinkable in law and policy for a man
to want to be “owned” in that way by his wife. Our language
and naming continues to instantiate women as objects, which
is why it is so difficult to conceive of something so objectively
simple as a man taking his wife’s name: women do not, and
never have, owned men.159
Given these strong negative responses toward men who forfeit their
names for those of their wives, a reform that only modifies the cur-
rent naming statutes by allowing both men and women to adopt
their spouses’ names would do little to change the status quo.
Instead, reforming the law to allow spouses to choose other non-
traditional naming options would provide couples with alternatives
that may be seen as less emasculating for men and more empower-
ing for women. Nontraditional options such as hyphenating names,
choosing a new name, or creating a merged name are compromises
between taking either spouse’s name, because both spouses have
equal ownership in the new name.160 This new name would help
represent the family as what it is: a new entity run by two partners.
B. Proposed Reform
As the previous sections demonstrate, the current naming system
should be reformed to prevent the perpetuation of outdated gen-
der norms, to allow each sex equal naming rights, and to give
people the freedom to choose their own names. This Section out-
lines a proposal for how to best achieve these goals.
Some scholars have suggested that the judiciary be the leader of
name-change reform,161 as was the case when women gained the
right to keep their birth names in the 1970s. However, because
these problems have existed for years with minimal judicial action,
this Note proposes that state legislatures proactively change their
laws. Though relying on states would be difficult because it would
159. See Anthony, supra note 55, at 211.
160. This was the main reason my parents decided to take an altogether-new name at
marriage. See supra note 57.
161. Suarez, supra note 46, at 241.
FALL 2013] Reforming the Name-Change Process for Couples 279
involve state-by-state adoption, it is also the most feasible route,
given that states already choose their own naming laws.
This Note’s suggested reform would allow both men and women
to change their surnames to whatever name they want, excluding
certain categories of names that have been consistently denied by
courts.162 The model statute below reflects one example of how
states could amend their naming laws to allow for more egalitarian
surnames at marriage. This model would allow couples to choose
almost any name at marriage while also protecting against fraudu-
lent uses of a name change and other valid reasons that courts have
denied name changes.
1. Model Statute
1) A party may indicate on the application for a marriage li-
cense the adoption of a name change. The surnames used
on the marriage license shall become the legal names of
the parties to the marriage. The parties may choose any
surname, excluding those outlined in Part (3). Naming op-
tions include, but are not limited to, the surname held by
either spouse before entering this marriage, a combination
of those names, or an altogether-new name. The marriage
license shall contain a statement that, when a name change
is requested and affixed to the marriage license, the new
name is the legal name of the requesting party.
2) An individual shall have only one legal name at any one
time.
3) Part (1) of this statute will not apply if:
a) There is substantial reason to believe that the party is
requesting the name change for fraudulent purposes.
b) The requested name is:
i) a website;
ii) a number;
iii) obscene or derogatory;
iv) more than three words in length;
v) the name of a cultural icon or other public figure;
vi) a reference to an illegal substance or criminal act;
vii) a reference to a government agency; or
viii) a foreign word that, when translated into English,
violates any of the aforementioned restrictions.
162. See generally Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Circumstances Justifying Grant or Denial of
Petition to Change Adult’s Name, 79 A.L.R.3d 562 (1977).
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c) The party requesting a name change has been con-
victed of a felony or has declared bankruptcy in the past
20 years.
d) The party requesting a name change is a registered sex
offender.
4) If Part (3) applies, the name change will not take effect.
Parties in this case must obtain a court order in order to
proceed with the intended name changes.
2. Explanation of the Proposed Statutory Scheme
Under this system, marriage applications would have a space for
couples to write in the names that they would use after marriage.
This system is currently used by Iowa, Minnesota, and Massachu-
setts,163 and the first section of the model statute is modeled after
the statute currently in effect in Iowa.164 Instead of favoring any sin-
gle naming choice, this statute lists the options in a non-
preferential way, so that a couple’s naming choice is based on their
personal preferences.
The model statute includes additional provisions to reduce the
need for judicial approval and likelihood of fraud. By prohibiting
specific kinds of name choices, section 3(a) removes the subjectivity
from the current name-change procedure. Several state courts have
stated that judges should approve a name change unless there is
reason to believe the name change is being used for fraudulent pur-
poses.165 Because this encourages a “rubber stamp” system to
approve name changes, there is no reason to require a judicial ap-
pearance, which costs money for both the applicant and the state
entity. By implementing a clear set of guidelines for what kinds of
names are permitted, states could avoid these costs while also mak-
ing the process fairer for those applying for nontraditional name
changes. The restrictions set forth in section 3(b) have been used
163. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. Although Iowa and Minnesota allow
people to change their full names through this process, this Note is only advocating for the
right for people to choose new surnames.
164. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., In re Knight, 537 P.2d 1085, 1086 (Colo. App. 1975); Shockley v. Okeke, 856
A.2d 1054, 1060 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004), reargument denied, No. FA020188208S, 2004 WL
2546793 (Conn. Super. Ct., Oct. 5, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 882 A.2d 1244 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2005), cert. granted in part, 895 A.2d 797 (Conn. 2006), appeal dismissed, 912 A.2d 991
(Conn. 2007) (stating that courts should grant applications for name change unless it ap-
pears that the applicant’s use of the new name will result in injury to some other person with
respect to his legal rights).
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by courts in the past,166 and are modeled after restrictions currently
used by states for personalized license plates.167 If a person’s name-
change request is denied because of any of the restrictions in the
statute, that person would then have the opportunity to persuade a
judge that their request should be granted through the court order
process.
Sections 3(b) and 3(c) also reduce the likelihood of fraud by re-
quiring that the people more likely to commit fraud undergo the
court order process. As mentioned previously, many states already
have additional restrictions for people who have been convicted of
felonies or declared bankruptcy in the past.168 Because the court
order process would be reserved for these specific circumstances,
the majority of name-change applicants would not have to spend
unnecessary time and money to change their names.
States that pass the reform outlined above should also take action
to make sure that other institutions accept marriage certificates as
proof of a name change, so that pressure from banks or other insti-
tutions does not replace the current pressure in place by many
states’ laws. Firmer laws in this area would give couples, especially
men, an authority to cite if their name change is denied by a bank
or other institution. If states do not enact such supplementary
changes, pressure from such institutions may deter people from se-
lecting nontraditional names at marriage, again taking away the
independent choice that a name change represented under com-
mon law.
166. See, e.g., In re Forchion, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 690, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding
denial of name change to NJweedman.com); Lee v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763,
765–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding trial judge’s denial of a name change, when the
name contained a racial epithet universally considered offensive and conducive to violence);
Ritchie v. Superior Court (In re Ritchie), 206 Cal. Rptr. 239, 240–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding denial of name change to Roman numeral III); In re Knight, 537 P.2d at 1086
(“[A court] should not deny the application for a change of name as being improper unless
special circumstances or facts are found to exist. Included in these would be  unworthy mo-
tive, the possibility of fraud on the public, or the choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly
lengthy, ridiculous or offensive to common decency and good taste.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); In re Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637, 639–40 (Minn. 1979) (upholding denial of
name change to 1069); Variable v. Nash, 190 P.3d 354, 355–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (up-
holding denial of name change to “Fuck Censorship!”); In re Handley, 736 N.E.2d 125,
126–27 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 2000) (denying name change to “Santa Robert Claus”).
167. See, e.g., Personalized License Plate, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP., http://www.iowadot.
gov/mvd/ovs/plates/personal.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
168. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Current naming laws insert the government into a deeply per-
sonal decision and perpetuate the notion that women are
subordinate to men. State statutes should be reformed to eliminate
the stereotypes embedded in the current system and to reflect
changes in American households and in society as a whole. This
Note recommends allowing parties to write new surnames onto
their wedding certificates, subject to limited restrictions, which
would take legal effect without a court order. That this system is
already well established in three states is evidence that it can be
implemented successfully. This change is not only constitutionally
necessary, but would also alleviate the burden on courts and
couples alike. If states change their laws to make alternative naming
more feasible, couples will more heavily consider what they want in
a name and may begin questioning why the man’s name is the
default.
